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More Cooperation, Less Uniformity:
Tax Deharmonization and the Future of the
International Tax Regime
Steven A. Dean*
Efforts to foster improved international tax coopertion have become preoccupied with
tax harmonization. Deharmonization offers the possibility of harmony without uniformity By
exploring two examples of tax deharrnoization in practice and considering the origins and
limitations of tax harmonization, this Article brings the tradftional emphasis on harmonization
into question. It then makes the case that deharmonization-cooperation without uniformniy-
could provide a viable alternative. Achieving tax deharmonization potential would require
revisiting some of the most basic elements of our cunvnt international tax regime, particularly
the benefits prmciple.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, prominent experts have engaged in a charged
debate over the nature of international taxation. On one side, Reuven
Avi-Yonah has made the case that a coherent international tax regime
not only exists, but is so deeply entrenched that it verges on customary
international law status.' On the other, H. David Rosenbloom has
observed that the persistently anarchic state of cross-border taxation
serves as proof that no such system exists One explanation for this
apparent contradiction is that the thousands of double-tax treaties that
make up our international tax regime, like silos left over from the Cold
War, have lost none of their power but are nonetheless useless in
today's asymmetric conflicts.'
1. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as InternationalLaw, 57 TAX L. REV.
483, 498 (2004) ("I briefly survey some examples that in my opinion strengthen the view that
an international tax regime does exist and that it rises to the level of customary international
law.").
2. See H. David Rosenbloom, International Tax Arbitrage and the International Tax
System," 53 TAX L. REv. 137, 166 (2000) (dismissing the idea of an "international tax
system" as "imaginary"). The debate appears to have reached a new pitch but is not entirely
new. Nancy Kaufman identifies a similar conflict between those who see customary
international tax law and those who do not. See Nancy H. Kaufman, Fairness and the
Taxation ofInternational Income, 29 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 145, 148 n.23 (1998).
3. The double-tax treaties that largely make up that regime may have played a key
role in taming the threat of double taxation, but they tend to seem about as relevant to today's
pressing problems, such as offshore tax evasion, as an enormous stockpile of Cold War
nuclear weapons is to preventing terrorists' attacks. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization,
Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1573, 1575-76
(2000) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Globalization] (highlighting inability of developed states to
enforce taxes on income derived from capital because of pressures of globalization); Reuven
S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation. A Proposal for Simplification, 74
TEX. L. REv. 1301, 1304 (1996) ("The current regime suffers from significant weaknesses,
especially in two areas in which the development of the world economy has made the
principles that were agreed upon in the 1920s and 1930s obsolete: the growth of
internationally mobile capital markets for portfolio investment and the rise of integrated
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This Article concludes that to win today's battles-including
bringing offshore tax evaders to heel and resolving conflicts with
relatively weak states-policymakers must embrace new tools and
strategies. The confounding combination of weakness and strength
that Avi-Yonah and Rosenbloom describe can in part be traced to a
misguided focus on uniformity. By emphasizing uniformity at the
expense of cooperation, the international tax regime squanders
opportunities to build interstate alliances and reduce cross-border tax
conflict. Allowing for the possibility of alternatives to the
conventional harmonization-based model of international tax
cooperation could help states to promote greater harmony, even when
harmonization is impossible.!
To evaluate the potential of international tax policies that
simultaneously embrace heterogeneity and cooperation, the Article
introduces the concept of tax deharmonization. Tax deharmonization,
international tax cooperation that calls for cooperating states to fill
complementary roles, may seem fanciful but has already come to play
an important role in efforts to resolve international tax conflicts.'
multinational enterprises (M3NEs)."); Steven A. Dean, The Incomplete GlobalMarket for Tax
Information, 49 B.C. L. REv. 605 (2008) (detailing inadequacy of existing extraterritorial tax
information acquisition infrastructure); Mitchell A. Kane, Strategy and Cooperation in
National Responses to International Tax Arbitrage, 53 EMORY L.J. 89 (2004) (noting
persistence of international tax arbitrage); Diane M. Ring, One Nation Among Many. Policy
Implications of Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage, 44 B.C. L. REv. 79 (2002) (examining
implications of international tax arbitrage for the international tax regime); Julie Roin, Tax
Treaties and Tax Competition (Sept. 25, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
Columbia Law School), available at http://www.law.columbia.edu/null/download?&
exclusive=filemgr.download&file id=162361 (suggesting that tax treaties may actually
contribute to the tax competition problem).
4. To those most familiar with it, it may seem a stretch to compare the international
tax regime to a cathedral, but it is instructive to consider the parallel between that regime and
software development. Eric Raymond used the cathedral metaphor to describe the pre-open
source method of developing complex software. SeeERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND
THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LNux AND OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY
(1999). Raymond explains how inexpensive, Internet-based communication facilitated the
emergence of a collaborative alternative to the conventional "cathedral" approach to software
development pursuant to which a small group of experts, known as "wizards;' create a
complex piece of software. Id. at 21-22. In the tax context, the most important wizards are
the "four economists," and their cathedral is the network of bilateral double-tax treaties that
acts as the backbone of the modem international tax regime. See infra note 76 and
accompanying text. Just as open-source software has provided a counterpoint to the
influence of the "geographically compact communities;' such as Bell Labs, that once
dominated the field, a fall in transaction costs could pave the way for the development of
innovative alternatives to our aging international tax cathedral. See RAYMOND, supr note 4,
at 51.
5. Unfortunately, even when deharmonization becomes reality, it goes unrecognized,
obscured by a veneer of harmonization. See infia notes 35-49 and accompanying text.
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When those conflicts involve profoundly different states,
deharmonization often represents the only means of forging a
relationship between them. Tax deharmonization is no panacea for all
of the international tax regime's ills, but only a clear-eyed assessment
will reveal the role it plays-and perhaps more importantly, could
play-in that regime.
One reason it may be helpful to shift our focus away from
uniformity and towards harmony is that the international tax landscape
is itself less homogenous than it was nearly a century ago when the
foundation of our current international tax regime was laid.6 Creating
a framework that acknowledges and accounts for the differences that
exist among states would make tax harmonization less important than
it traditionally has been.' That would be consistent with the
conclusions of scholarly examinations of tax harmonization. Until
recently, it was more or less taken for granted that harmonization, a
convergence among national tax systems towards a universal ideal,
represented the surest route to greater efficiency.8 That assumption has
6. "[A]dvocates of tax harmonization overstate their case by implicitly assuming the
fungibility of governments and jurisdictions. Countries are not like bushels of corn,
indistinguishable from one another. Instead, they vary along many different dimensions...."
Julie Roin, Competition andEvasion: Another Perspective on International Tax Competition,
89 GEo. L.J. 543, 561 (2001). Even at the most basic level, the characteristics of states are
not uniform. See, e.g., Diane M. Ring, What at Stake in the Sovereignty Debate.?.
International Tax and the Nation-State, 49 VA. J. INT'L L. 155, 161 (2008) ("[S]tates vary
widely in the degree to which they possess and demonstrate the elements of sovereignty
...."1).
7. Adam H. Rosenzweig, Why Are there Tax Havens? (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author) (criticizing the failure of the international tax regime to recognize the
significance of differences among nations such as their relative marginal returns on capital).
There are exceptions, of course. The most significant is the traditional distinction between
capital importers and capital exporters. See Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O'Hear, The
"Original Intent" of US. International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1033-34 (1997) (noting
conflict between capital importers and exporters). Of course, yesterday's capital exporters
can become today's capital importers (the United States being a particularly striking example
of this). Structural differences among nations-such as size and population-are likely to
prove more problematic. By contrast, the fiscal federalism literature focuses on the
differences between jurisdictions that exist at the subnational level and "explores, both in
normative and positive terms, the roles of the different levels of government and the ways in
which they relate to one another." Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 J.
EcoN. LITERATURE 1120, 1120 (1999). Although many of the considerations of fiscal
federalism are irrelevant to the international context, to the extent that national governments
differ in the same way as levels of government, fiscal federalism may suggest that they should
not try to fill identical roles.
8. Even Avi-Yonah's alternative withholding tax scheme to facilitate capital income
taxation called on each cooperating jurisdiction to play parallel roles. Avi-Yonah,
Globahiaion, supra note 3, at 1672-74. Harmonization is often either implicitly or explicitly
assumed to be a necessary condition for an optimally efficient international tax regime. See,
e.g., Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Evaluating International Tax Reform 17 (Harvard
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created a longstanding bias towards harmonization in cross-border tax
matters9  that has increasingly been brought into question.'"
Economists have demonstrated that "the efficiency of tax
harmonization is far from clear-cut."' Current tax scholarship
likewise illustrates the risks posed by assuming that there are no
meaningful differences among nations.'
2
If the international tax regime is to outgrow its excessive reliance
on uniformity, it is essential that we understand the obstacles to
deharmonization. Will deharmonization be able to capitalize on the
NOM, Working Paper No. 03-48, 2003), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfirn?
abstract id=425943 ("[G]lobal welfare is maximized by harmonizing the taxation of foreign
income among capital-exporting countries... ,'). Sometimes the desire for harmonization is
expressed through criticism of nonconforming states. The OECD initiative against harmful
tax competition offers a notable recent example. See Steven A. Dean, Philosopher Kings and
International Tax: A New Approach to Tax Havens, Tax Fhght, and International Tax
Cooperation, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 911, 919 & n.65 (2007) (observing that the initiative
identified "uncooperative tax havens" based on the absence of characteristics typical of
OECD members). Of course there are exceptions to the harmonization consensus. See
generally Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated
Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1357, 1412-13 (2001)
("Caution, however, is warranted in assuming that conforming our nation's tax system with
that of other nations, even developed nations with effective income taxes, will inevitably
improve our national welfare."); Roin, supra note 6 (critiquing arguments in favor of
harmonization).
9. Even before our current international tax regime took shape, symmetry in cross-
border tax matters was extremely common. See infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
The same pro-symmetry bias is evident in the double-tax treaties that give form to the
international tax regime and in more recent efforts to create its successor. See infia Part II.
One notable exception is the U.N. model treaty designed to be used between developed and
developing states. Allison D. Christians, Tax Treaties for Investment andAid to Sub-Saharan
Africa: A Case Study, 71 BROOK. L. REv. 639, 661-64 (2005) (describing origins and
purpose of the U.N. model treaty). Another exception is tax sparing. Id at 692-95
(discussing the operation and ramifications of tax sparing provisions).
10. Scholars have noted specific examples of the limitations of harmonization-based
strategies. See, e.g., Julie Roin, Rethinking Tax Treaties in a Strategic World with Disparate
Tax Systems, 81 VA. L. REv. 1753, 1755-56 (1995) ("I argue that many of the fundamental
revenue assumptions underlying the policy of seeking reductions in source taxation are
incorrect when the treaty partner is a country with an integration system, and are particularly
inappropriate when the treaty partner has an imputation system.").
11. Carl Gaign6 & St~phane Riou, Globalization, Asymmetric Tax Competition, and
Fiscal Equalization, 9 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 901, 902 (2007) (arguing that while tax
competition may "distort the spatial allocation of capital[, tax] harmonization may not be
desirable"). When economic differences between nations are taken into account,
harmonization can be affirmatively harmful. See Richard E. Baldwin & Paul Krugman,
Agglomeration, Integration and Tax Harmonisation, 48 EUR. ECON. RE. 1, 21 (2004) ("In
our model, simple tax harmonisation--defined as adoption of a common tax rate-always
harms at least one nation and the seemingly sensible policy of adopting a rate that is between
the two initial rates turns out to harm both nations.").
12. See Rosenzweig, supra note 7 (explaining that by failing to distinguish among
jurisdictions across relevant criteria the international tax regime could inhibit cooperation).
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decline in interjurisdictional transaction costs that, as Anne-Marie
Slaughter'3 and others" have noted, has transformed so many other
international legal regimes? Will parochialism-here, in the form of
the "benefits principle"--be as much of an impediment to
deharmonization as it has been for harmonization? Ultimately, this
Article answers those questions with a yes and a maybe, concluding
that the answer to the second depends on the willingness of states to
conceptualize their rights and obligations in new ways.
II. DEHARMONIZATION
As long as national tax systems develop in response to unique
social and administrative pressures,'5 jurisdictions will continue to rely
on tax systems that exhibit at least as many differences as similarities. 6
Tax harmonization represents the traditional answer to that entropic
pressure, reflecting a confidence that nations can avoid international
tax conflicts by becoming more like one another. Unfortunately, in
part because many of the jurisdictions that populate today's
international tax landscape have little in common, it seems that
harmonization is no longer equal to the task. This Part introduces the
concept of deharmonization, an alternative to harmonization that may
be more robust. 7
A. Tax Deharmonization
If the drive for harmonization is motivated by the potential
benefits of conformity, deharmonization draws inspiration from the
advantages of specialization.'" In a sense, pining for global
13. See generallyANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).
14. See generally REGULATORY CO-OPERATION FOR AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD
(Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev. ed., 1994).
15. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
16. That diversity may actually make harmonization counterproductive. "[V]arying
social traditions, values, and economic conditions ... may not be well-served by
harmonization .... Harmonization ... might increase economic or social costs." Scott H.
Jacobs, Regulatory Co-Operation for an Interdependent World' Issues for Government, in
REGULATORY CO-OPERATION FOR AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 33 (Org. for Econ. Co-
Operation and Dev. ed., 1994). Although the same diversity exists in all types of regulation to
some extent, this dynamic may be especially significant when it comes to taxation for two
reasons. First, tax policy implicates a wider array of issues and interests than, for example,
the rules governing the issuance of securities and the protection of shareholders. Second, the
near absence of frictions preventing taxpayers from capitalizing on any asymmetries that do
exist magnifies the significance of even relatively minor variations in tax rules.
17. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
18. See infia notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 84:125
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homogeneity in taxation and the welfare benefits it could produce is
not so different than farmers in the nineteenth-century American West
wishing ranchers and their crop-trampling cattle would just disappear
into the sunset.'9 Those farmers, like newly arrived homeowners
unhappy about a smoke-bellowing factory in their midst, only wanted
their neighbors to be like them." Unfortunately, they lacked the power
to compel conformity and could not rely on consensual private
ordering tools to achieve it.2'
Of course, as those two scenarios suggest, under the right
circumstances conformity might not be necessary or even desirable.
The groups might collectively be better off if the ranchers could pay
the farmers to install fencing around their fields or if the homeowners
paid the factory owner to use a better grade of coal to eliminate
noxious emissions." In a perfect world, all such deals would be struck
and there would be less need for potentially inefficient rules ensuring
conformity. One reason many such arrangements are not created is the
presence of transaction costs."
19. Coase famously uses the problem of cattle straying onto neighboring land and
causing damage to illustrate the challenges of limiting the harmful effects a business has on
neighboring landowners. SeeR.H. COASE, THE FIRM THE MARKETAND THE LAW 13 (1988).
20. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1121-23 (1972)
(considering efficiency and distributional implications of a factory using cheap, polluting
coal in a wealthy residential neighborhood).
21. One potential tool would be restrictive covenants. Even if we assume away
procedural obstacles to creating such covenants, there remains the substantive question of
why one party would agree to live by a standard that happens to suit his or her neighbors.
22. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
23. Ellickson provides a useful illustration of the potential inefficiency of
homogeneity by describing the inefficiencies produced by the absence of a "mom-and-pop or
convenience-type grocery store" in the Santa Monica Mountains as a result of zoning
restrictions. See Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules,
and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681, 684-85 (1973). Ellickson suggests
that a government could produce a more efficient result by making it easy for grocers and
their neighbors to reach a private contractual agreement to compensate neighbors for the
harms imposed on them by the existence of the grocery store instead of simply banning
grocery stores through zoning. Id. at 686.
24. COASE, supra note 19, at 115 ("Once the costs of carrying out market transactions
are taken into account, it is clear that such a rearrangement of fights will only be undertaken
when the increase in the value of production ... is greater than the costs which would be
involved in bringing it about."). A different problem is posed by uncertainty about initial
entitlements. In the domestic context, initial entitlements are determined by the state. See
Calabresi & Melamed, supa note 20, at 1090. In the international tax context, entitlements to
tax revenues are a function of norms such as the benefits principle. See infra note 79 and
accompanying text. Those norm-based entitlements are much more likely to be the subject of
dispute than those established by the state.
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In rare cases, those bargains would allow states to divide large
gains-what Mancur Olson might refer to as "Big Bills Left on the
Sidewalk. '25 Tax flight treaties, for example, a variation on Calabresi
and Melamed's pay-the-polluter approach,26 could allow the United
States alone to split a portion of $50 billion per year in revenues with
tax havens.27 The amount of U.S. income tax revenues such an
arrangement with even a single leading tax haven could yield suggests
that either extraordinarily high transaction costs or a degree of
irrationality poses an obstacle to their creation."
In general, the payoffs are likely to be smaller. For instance, a
country that hosts a substantial amount of U.S. investment might agree
to collect and provide the United States with information about
Qualified Electing Funds 9 with U.S. shareholders." The United States
could pay for that assistance just as neighboring homeowners might
pay a factory owner to upgrade the coal it uses." Whether such a
bargain would be worthwhile depends largely on the balance between
25. Mancur Olson, Jr., Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk. Why Some Nations Are Rich,
and Others Poor, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 22 (1996) (arguing that improving government
institutions and economic policies can help realize many gains from specialization and trade).
26. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 20, at 1121-23.
27. See Dean, supra note 8, at 917 n.27.
28. If tax evaders and their agents share benefits of $100 in the form of unpaid taxes,
a cooperative intergovernmental arrangement that allows participating governments to collect
and share that $100 would almost certainly leave those governments collectively better off
than they would be without an agreement. Because the actual benefits are so large-for
example, the estimated U.S. revenue losses attributed to tax flight are an order of magnitude
larger than the GDP of the Cayman Islands-it seems likely that a mutually beneficial
intergovernmental deal could be struck at the expense of tax cheats. See Joseph Guttentag &
Reuven Avi-Yonah, Closing the International Tax Gap, in BRIDGING THE TAX GAP:
ADDRESSING THE CRISIS IN FEDERAL TAX ADMINISTRATION 101 (Max B. Sawicky ed., 2005)
(estimating U.S. losses to tax flight at $50 billion per year); U.S. Cent. Intelligence Agency,
The World Factbook: Field Listing--GDP, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/fields/2001 .html?countryName=&countryCode=&regionCode=? (last visited
Oct. 23, 2009) (estimating the Cayman GDP for 2004 at just under $2 billion).
29. A QEF is a specific type of non-U.S. corporation whose shareholders are subject
to current U.S. taxation on the income of the corporation. See 26 U.S.C. § 1295 (2006).
Because the corporation is foreign, U.S. tax authorities have limited means to verify the tax
information self-reported by taxpayers.
30. If the United States were to strike this deal with France, it would be a little like
the United States paying France to "fence out" aggressive U.S. taxpayers, sparing the United
States the need to fence them in.
31. This is a solution to one of the difficulties the United States faces in monitoring
the extraterritorial activities of its taxpayers that is not premised on increased harmonization.
A harmonization-based approach would encourage France to adopt QEF rules equivalent to
those employed by the United States so that they could collect and would want to exchange
QEF information with the United States.
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the costs of implementing the arrangement and the benefits it would
produce.
These two illustrations suggest the potential specialization holds
to create alliances that expand the reach of the international tax regime
beyond the limits of harmonization. Unlike harmonization-based
approaches, neither arrangement would require all parties to perform
precisely the same functions for precisely the same reasons. Instead,
states could play complementary roles and even be motivated by
different incentives. Because deharmonization does not require a
"double coincidence of wants," it could succeed in creating efficient
cooperative arrangements between jurisdictions with little in
common.
32
Those examples also reveal an important reason that deharmoni-
zation might be normatively desirable as well as practical.3 As
considered below, sometimes specialization produces a more efficient
outcome than homogeneity. As intergovernmental transaction costs
continue to fall, the benefits of at least some forms of international tax
specialization may soon be within reach.
B. Dehamonization in Disguise
Deharmonization strategies promise mutual benefits for
cooperating states. The mystery then is what prevents the emergence
of these types of relationships. One possibility is that asymmetric
cooperative arrangements simply do not work in the real world. This
Subpart shows that this is only partly true. Asymmetric cooperative
tax arrangements do exist, but only when they can be made to look like
32. Thinking of the limits of barter transactions offers one way to understand the
harmonization conundrum. The success of barter transactions is limited by the fact that they
require a "double coincidence of wants" to take place. DICTIONARY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
33 (Craig Calhoun ed., 2002). For reciprocal harmonization to occur, jurisdictions must have
the same coincidence of wants. As a result, the less similar those jurisdictions are, the less
likely they are to harmonize.
33. Ellickson's grocery store example illustrates the potential benefits of speciali-
zation. See Ellickson, supra note 23, at 648-85. On the one hand, a flat ban on grocery stores
provides a benefit by ensuring that no individual property owner is able to impose
uncompensated costs on its neighbors by opening a grocery store. However, such a ban
would also prevent a group of neighbors from affirmatively bargaining to allocate the costs
and benefits of opening a grocery store. As a result, even if opening a grocery store would
not impose any uncompensated harm on any property owner while producing a net benefit
for the community as a whole, the ban would still apply, leaving the entire community less
well off.
2009]
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the product of harmonization." Two examples of that pattern-
deharmonization made to look like harmonization-follow.
The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) is an agreement
among South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland
that, among other functions, facilitates the collection and sharing of tax
revenues." The 1969 SACU agreement provided that "[a]ny customs,
excise, sales and additional duties collected in the common customs
area shall be paid quarterly into the Consolidated Revenue Fund of
South Africa."36 A portion of those revenues was then paid by South
Africa to Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland according to a
formula, with South Africa retaining the balance." The special role the
1969 agreement assigned to South Africa-in effect acting as a tax
administrator for its SACU partners-was consistent with its dominant
economic position within SACU"8
In 2002, a revised SACU agreement went into effect.39
Nominally, the 2002 agreement transformed SACU from a
hierarchical arrangement with South Africa in control to one in which
34. The most common example of what can be thought of as deharmonization in
disguise is tax sparing. See generally Kim Brooks, Tax Sparing: A Needed Incentive for
Foreign Investment in Low-Income Countries or an Unnecessary Revenue Sacnfice?, 34
QUEEN'S L.J. 505 (2009). Tax sparing is an arcane arrangement between pairs of countries
that typically attempts to preserve the benefits of tax incentives offered by a developing
country with the cooperation of a developed country. "When a tax sparing provision is
properly constructed, it provides what is in effect a grant from a capital-exporting [developed]
country to a taxpayer operating in a capital-importing [developing] country, to assist in the
latter's development." Id at 558. Tax sparing's appeal is partly its capacity to provide an
asymmetric benefit to a developing country while "avoid[ing] the paternalism often inherent
in direct grant programs for foreign aid administered by high-income countries." Id. at 549.
35. See S. African Customs Union, History of SACU, http://www.sacu.int/about.php?
include=about/history.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2009). SACU claims to be the "world's
oldest customs union." Id
36. 1969 Southern African Customs Union Agreement art. 13, Dec. 11, 1969,
U.N.T.S. 70 [hereinafter 1969 SACU Agreement].
37. Id. art. 14. That revenue-sharing formula contained a
compensation mechanism to account for the effects a customs union can have on
its less developed members. In the case of SACU, South Africa compensated for
the fact that it gathered more economic gains due to the SACU arrangement than
its partners by distributing a disproportionate amount of SACU tax revenues to
Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland (and later Namibia).
JAMES J. HENTZ, SOUTH AFRICA AND THE LoGic OF REGIONAL COOPERATION 12 (2005).
38. South Africa's 2008 GDP was an order of magnitude larger than the combined
GDPs of its four partners. See World Bank, World Development Indicators Database: Gross
Domestic Product 2008 (Oct. 7, 2009), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/
Resources/GDP.pdf.
39. 2002 Southern African Customs Union Agreement (Oct. 21, 2002) [hereinafter
2002 SACU Agreement], available athttp://www.sacu.int/main.php?include=docs/legislation/
2002-agreement/main/html.
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member states operate on equal footing."° In reality, the 2002 revisions
did little to alter the basic economics of SACU ' Nothing in the
revised SACU agreement prevents South Africa from continuing to
play the lead role in administering the revenue fund 2 Although SACU
remains a fundamentally asymmetric arrangement, since the 2002
revisions it appears to be one in which no SACU member plays a role
different from any other. It is, in other words, deharmonization
disguised as harmonization.
The same pattern, formal equality masking important substantive
differences, can be seen in Tax Information Exchange Agreements
(TIEAs)."3 The modem TIEA first emerged in the 1980s in response to
concern about offshore tax evasion.' Recognizing that secrecy played
40. The 2002 SACU Agreement means that the SACU operates according to a "one-
country, one-vote formula and major decisions of the various intergovernmental and regional
institutions require consensus." Martina Metzger, Regional Cooperation and Integration in
Sub-SaharanAflica 10 (United Nations Conference on Trade and Dev., Discussion Paper No.
189, 2008), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/osgdp20084_en.pdf. It created a
Council of Ministers that was to "consist of at least one Minister from each Member State
and ... be the supreme decision making authority of SACU matters." 2002 SACU
Agreement, supra note 39, art. 8, T 1. Rather than being paid into the Consolidated Revenue
Fund of South Africa, SACU revenues are now paid into a Common Revenue Pool managed
by either a member state or a SACU body, appointed at the discretion of the Council of
Ministers. Id. arts. 32-33.
41. The 2002 SACU Agreement appears to have preserved the basic elements of the
1969 agreement in substance if not in form. For instance, South Africa was designated as the
administrator of the Common Revenue Pool "for a transitional period." 2002 SACU
Agreement, supra note 39, art. 33. As an economic matter, the 2002 revisions "provided the
BLNS with basically the same implicit revenue transfers as they had been receiving under the
old agreement. Its main benefit for South Africa is that it put a cap on the amount of
transfers required under the agreement." Frank Flatters & Matthew Stem, SACU Revenue
Sharing: Issues and Options 2.2 (Aug. 2006) (unpublished comment), available at
http://www.dnafrica.com/publications.php.
42. It appears that South Africa does indeed continue to play the lead role in
administering SACU. See Tsidiso Disenyana, Development Through Trade (Nov. 3, 2008),
http://bilaterals.org/spip.php?article 13701.
43. TIEAs aspire to be a way to bridge the divide between very different types of
states. In that sense, they are yet another effort to break free of the harmonization
conundrum. They attempt to accomplish that by narrowing their focus to a single aspect of
the traditional international tax ties between states: information exchange. At some level, the
agreements could encourage tax harmonization between a pair of jurisdictions just as double-
tax treaties do. See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text. Access to tax information of
the type needed to enforce a comprehensive, modem income tax provides an incentive for the
TIEA partner to develop one. Unfortunately, that modest incentive is almost certainly
insufficient to produce any meaningful harmonization.
44. Information exchange agreements have a much longer history, dating back to the
early part of the twentieth century. Today's information exchange agreements are quite
different from the older versions. See Dean, supa note 3, at 637-57 (describing development
of information exchange agreements).
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a crucial role in taxpayers' efforts to avoid U.S. income taxes, 4 the
United States pursued TIEAs to acquire the extraterritorial tax
information necessary to identify the investments and income of U.S.
taxpayers.46
TIEAs are essentially a single article stripped from a typical
double-tax treaty. Like those treaties, TIEAs employ a structure that
assigns reciprocal rights and obligations between pairs of states. The
1984 U.S. model agreement offers a useful illustration. It provides that
the "competent authorities of the Contracting States shall exchange
information to administer and enforce the domestic laws of the
Contracting States concerning taxes.'' 7  Such language ensures the
agreement imposes identical obligations on, and grants equivalent
rights to, both signatories.
Although TIEAs are formally reciprocal, because they typically
exist between states that are profoundly different, their nominal
symmetry tends to be illusory. In practice, one state is likely to need
extraterritorial tax information covered by the TEA while the other
does not. When that is true, tax information in fact only flows in one
direction. If the U.S. model TIEA described above were to enter into
force between the United States and a hypothetical tax haven, the
45. Lynnley Browning, An Offshore Spotlight for Madofl, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31,
2008, at B I (describing inquiry into whether offshore Madoff investment vehicles were used
to help investors evade U.S. taxes by hiding income from U.S. authorities).
46. See Bruce Zagaris, The Procedural Aspects of US. Tax Policy Towards
Developing Countries: Too Many Sticks and No Carrots., 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 331,
332-34 (2003).
47. 1984 U.S. Model Exchange of Information Agreement art. 4, para. 1. The U.S.
model treaty of that period similarly states that the "competent authorities of the Contracting
States shall exchange such information as is necessary for carrying out the provisions of this
Convention or of the domestic laws of the Contracting States concerning taxes." 1981 U.S.
Model Income and Capital Tax Convention art. 26, 1. The OECD model TIEA uses the
same neutral formulation. For example, it provides that "[e]ach Contracting Party shall
ensure that its competent authorities for the purposes specified in Article I of the Agreement,
have the authority to obtain and provide upon request: information held by banks." Org. for
Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters art. 5,
4, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/I 5/43/2082215.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2009).
48. The report of a U.N. group concluded that because of structural differences in the
tax regimes of TIEA partners, the relatively advanced TIEA partner would receive, but would
not be required to provide, tax information. United Nations Ad Hoc Group of Experts on
Int'l Cooperation in Tax Matters, Tax Treatment of Cross-Border Interest Income and Capital
Flights.- Recent Developments 52, U.N. Doc. ST/SG/AC.8/2003/L.10 (July 9, 2003)




United States would receive information about its taxpayers and the
tax haven would not.49
C Two Types ofDeharmomzation
SACU and TIEAs share important characteristics. Both create
frameworks in which states engage in cross-border cooperation by
filling roles consistent with their respective strengths and needs. They
also illustrate an important point of divergence among deharmoni-
zation strategies. Pursuant to the SACU agreement, participating
states pool and share tax revenues. TIEAs by contrast only envision
administrative assistance, in the form of extraterritorial tax
information, flowing across borders. This Article refers to SACU-style
deharmonization as base deharmonization ° and to TIEA deharmoniza-
tion as administrative deharmonization.5'
In a sense, base deharmonization differs from administrative
deharmonization in the extent-rather than the kind-of the
interjurisdictional cooperation it represents. Both call for states to
expend tax resources in a way that might not increase the amount of
revenue extracted from their own tax bases. Base deharmonization,
unlike administrative deharmonization, calls for states to share the
benefits of cooperation in the same way that they share the burdens.
Both forms could be employed in connection with virtually any form
of taxation, from an income tax to a carbon tax. Despite their
49. The basic premise of TIEAs is that a tax haven can acquire sought-after tax
information more cheaply than its TIEA partner. If that is true, this specialization would be
efficient, creating the possibility of gains for both parties.
50. Even when considered only in the context of a single tax, base deharmonization
could take a variety of forms. One jurisdiction might play a lead role in administering the tax
in exchange for a disproportionate share of the collective revenues generated by the tax. See
infr note 107 and accompanying text. Allocating tasks to governments based on their
relative strengths instead of requiring each government to fill every role would be
advantageous. For a new tax, such as the carbon tax, the benefits of that aggregation would
be particularly pronounced. The compensation element may be complicated by the indirect
economic implications of the interstate relationship. For example, in the case of the SACU,
South Africa (the lead administrator) actually receives a disproportionately small percentage
of tax revenues because the existence of the SACU free trade zone is an enormous boon to
South Africa. Limiting carbon emissions could likewise create disproportionate nontax
benefits for developed states, making it possible that they would both bear a relatively heavy
administrative burden and receive a relatively small share of aggregate carbon tax revenues.
51. The discussion is limited to these two categories of deharmonization, but that
focus is not intended to suggest that this is the only possible way to distinguish among
deharmonization strategies.
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similarities, the differences between them are significant enough that it
is appropriate to distinguish between the two forms. 2
Regardless of the particular form it takes, deharmonization would
mark a dramatic departure from orthodox international tax
policymaking. The bulk of the extant regime is designed to both
capitalize on and to deepen similarities among nations' tax systems.
The next Part explores how tax harmonization became synonymous
with international tax cooperation and then considers the practical
limitations of a symmetry-based approach.
III. THE LIMITS OF TAx HARMONIZATION
Domestically, tax simplification has long been the holy grail of
tax policy, constantly pursued but never attained. 3 Tax harmonization
may be its equivalent in the international tax policy context. For the
same reasons that commentators bemoan the insidious harms of
complexity,54 the big" and small56 differences among national tax
systems are seen as a drag on efficiency and a detriment to global
welfare. As Part III explains, within a single jurisdiction, complexity
distorts taxpayer behavior and imposes significant costs on individuals
and businesses. Cross-border tax differences do the same when
taxpayers' activities extend across national boundaries.
It is important to recognize, however, that the analogy between
harmonization and simplification is imperfect. Unlike simplification,
harmonization lacks a persuasive, independent normative foundation.
52. Administrative deharmonization requires a relatively modest degree of interaction
between jurisdictions. Collaboration that calls for one jurisdiction to contribute a portion of
its tax base to a joint effort is likely to involve a significantly higher level of engagement.
More importantly, as discussed infra Part V, they raise different types of implementation
concerns.
53. Edward J. McCaffery, The Holy Grail of Tax Simplification, 1990 Wis. L. REv.
1267, 1267 (1990) ("People have long sought, or said they have sought, simpler tax laws. Yet,
by most measures, tax laws remain extremely complex." (citation omitted)).
54. See Steven A. Dean, Attractive Complexity: Tax Deregulation, the Check-the-
Box Election, and the Future of Tax Simplification, 34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 405, 416 & nn.45-46
(2005) (noting preservation of resources as a common reason for objecting to tax
complexity).
55. Tax flight offers an example of the problems that arise when tax regimes are
fundamentally different. Tax flight often results when a regime with a sophisticated income
tax collides with one that lacks key features of that tax. The resulting mismatch allows tax
cheats to camouflage their income in order to hide it from tax authorities. See Dean, supra
note 8, at 924-25.
56. International tax arbitrage occurs when taxpayers are able to exploit relatively
subtle differences between national tax regimes in the same way that fimancial arbitrageurs
are able to exploit market inefficiencies to capitalize on relatively small price differences.
See Kane, supra note 3, at 109.
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As the preceding and subsequent Parts show, cooperation-not
harmonization-is the desired outcome in international taxation.
Harmonization can lay claim to a lineage even older than the
international tax regime itself, but tradition alone does not make
harmonization indispensable.
A. Tax Hamonization
Understanding what is meant by the term "tax harmonization" is
surprisingly challenging." One might think that in its purest form, tax
harmonization would mean simply translating one set of tax laws into
each relevant language and having them enacted by each nation's
legislature. In reality, such an effort would in some respects go too far,
while in others it would not go far enough to achieve an idealized form
of harmonization.
Because the objective of tax harmonization is eliminating
differences between tax systems from the taxpayer's perspective,
formal differences may be insignificant. As a result, insisting that
literal translations of any given statutory provision be employed in
each jurisdiction would often be pointless. 8 At the same time, merely
using identical statutory language offers no guarantee those laws will
be interpreted and applied in an identical fashion.
Substantive, rather than merely formal, tax harmonization would
require each nation to create tax regimes that are identical in three
principal respects. First, each nation would need to tax the same assets
and activities. In other words, each nation's tax base would need to be
precisely the same as every other nation's tax base." Second, the rate
57. The same is true of simplification. See Boris I. Bittker, Tax Reform and Tax
Simplification, 29 U. MiAMi L. REv. 1, 1 (1974) ("Neither 'tax simplification' nor its mirror
image, complexity, is a concept that can be easily defined or measured.").
58. Mutual recognition of regulatory regimes sometimes serves as a substitute for
traditional harmonization. It reflects the insight that rules need not be identical to achieve
equivalent regulatory results. Mutual recognition has recently been the focus of cross-border
securities regulation cooperation. See Press Release, Delegation of the European Comm'n to
the USA, Statement of the European Commission and US Securities and Exchange
Commission on Mutual Recognition in Securities Markets (Feb. 1, 2008),
http://www.eurunion.org/eu/index.php?option=com-content&task-view&id=1 576&Itemid=
58 (expressing U.S./EU intention to facilitate investor access to foreign securities by
recognizing the adequacy of investor protections offered by foreign jurisdictions).
59. The base on which a tax is imposed refers to the economic event that triggers the
tax or the asset on which the tax is levied. The range of tax bases employed by different
jurisdictions is wide. Some jurisdictions rely heavily on consumption taxes such as value-
added taxes. Others, such as the United States, rely heavily on income taxes. Even among
tax bases that are broadly similar, the differences can be significant. For example, a tax on
income could be limited to specific categories of income (such as wages) or it could be a
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of tax imposed on those tax bases would need to be the same in every
jurisdiction." Finally, each nation's tax laws would need to be
administered in a comparable fashion." Only by achieving a high
degree of conformity with respect to each of those three criteria can
two or more nations be said to have achieved true tax harmonization.
Unfortunately, that is much easier said than done.
Altering national legal and regulatory structures represents one
path towards harmonization. International agreements provide both an
alternative to, and a means of, advancing the harmonization of purely
domestic rules. To the extent that states can rewrite their domestic
laws through international law, statutory and regulatory differences
may be made irrelevant. Treaties and other instruments can also
promote uniformity in a more subtle way.
Double-tax treaties, for example, encourage states to adopt and
retain income taxes." Those double-tax treaties form the core of the
international tax regime. As the following discussion explains, they
also serve as a direct link to an era that ordinarily seems far removed
from the issues that confront today's policymakers. Conceived well
comprehensive tax on all forms of economic income. In addition, subtractions from or
additions to a given tax base are often introduced to subsidize or discourage particular
activities. Those deviations represent policy decisions that depend entirely on the needs and
priorities of particular jurisdictions. Tax base harmonization need not be accompanied by tax
rate harmonization. See infr note 60 and accompanying text. Base harmonization alone,
however, is no substitute for base and rate harmonization combined. See, e.g., Michael J.
Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Income Tax Discrimination and the Political and Economic
Integmtion of Europe, 115 YALE L.J. 1186, 1227-32 (2006) (examining current European
proposal to harmonize only the base of the corporate tax within the European Union).
60. The second important dimension along which tax regimes differ is the nominal
rate that applies to a given base. In the simplest case, the amount of tax due is determined by
multiplying a single rate by the chosen base. That suggests that two tax regimes employing
an identical base need only add an identical rate to be perfectly matched. In practice,
achieving true parity is difficult even when questions of tax base are put to one side. One
reason is that instead of being applied at a single rate, rates often differ according to a
taxpayer's status. For example, the United States imposes income tax at rates ranging from
0% up to a nominal maximum of 35%, varying according to the nature and amount of
income earned by a taxpayer and the taxpayer's status. See 26 U.S.C. § 1(i) (2006).
61. The last key difference among tax regimes is a function of the different tools and
methods tax authorities use to encourage taxpayers to pay the taxes that they owe. In recent
years, a renewed focus on issues such as the "tax gap" has underscored the importance of
choices about the administration of a tax regime. See generally Guttentag & Avi-Yonah,
supra note 28. As a practical matter, even if two tax regimes were identical both in terms of
base and rates, employing different enforcement mechanisms could produce very different
results for taxpayers. For example, if an income tax were imposed on a base that included
both wage income and investment income, but wages are subject to information reporting and
withholding while investment income is subject to neither reporting nor withholding, the
effective tax rate on the latter would be significantly lower.
62. See infla notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
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before the end of the colonial era, these treaties remain extraordinarily
influential.
B. TheAge ofEasy SInmety
Of the many ways that harmonization assumed a central role in
the international tax regime, perhaps the least obvious to even those
most familiar with that regime, is a byproduct of the influence of the
small group of economists generally credited with its creation.63 Their
nearly century-old blueprint provides the framework around which that
regime has evolved.' As this Subpart suggests, it may have been
inevitable that they would incorporate symmetry deeply into their
design.
This Subpart starts by taking a step back from the modem
international tax regime to consider how governments addressed
questions of asymmetry and harmonization before the threat of double
taxation and the treaties meant to tame it took center stage. It begins
by describing the world in which the principal architects of today's
international tax regime learned to tackle important cross-border tax
policy challenges. Put bluntly, it presents a picture of a time when
symmetry could be, and emphatically was, taken for granted.
By importing that presumption of uniformity into the institutional
structures that form the foundation of today's international tax regime,
that small group of experts implicitly chose harmonization
(homogeneity) over deharmonization (specialization). From the start,
that choice proved to be problematic." Over the course of the
twentieth century, as the international community came to be
populated by an increasingly diverse group of independent actors and
as technological change forced them to live in close virtual proximity
to one another, the limitations of tax harmonization became
increasingly troublesome.
Although tax harmonization has come to be perceived as the
primary counterbalance to a host of ills, that need not have been the
63. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, All of a Piece Throughout- The Four Ages of
US. International Taxation, 25 VA. TAX REv. 313, 317-18 (2005) (listing Thomas Adams,
Edwin Seligman, and Mitchell Carroll as the "three principal American" international tax law
figures from the early years of the international tax regime).
64. See infia notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
65. See Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 7, at 1033-34 (describing conflict between
capital importers and exporters in the early days of the modern international tax regime). It is
interesting to think of what an asymmetrical, deharmonized resolution to that conflict might
have looked like. Would collection have been concentrated in one or more importing
nations?
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case. The historical context in which the international tax regime's
foundation was laid raises the possibility that uniformity may have
been made important simply because it was familiar, rather than
because of any normative commitment to it.
During the nineteenth century, Europe and its sub-Saharan
African colonies could not have been more different. Nevertheless,
from a tax standpoint, the two became a well-matched pair.66 Certainly,
it is remarkable that the tax systems of the metropoles and colonies
were so similar." One could also ask a more fundamental question.
Why would those colonies even attempt to collect taxes? The relative
revenue potential of the metropolitan and colonial tax bases was
obviously quite different." Presumably, the metropoles could have
eliminated the need for any taxes at the colonial level with relatively
subtle rate increases at home.
Popular resistance to the idea of subsidizing the colonies, 9 along
with a skepticism regarding the benefits of colonial investments"0 and
66. Not only did colonies by and large collect the taxes necessary to defray their
administrative expenses in essentially the same way as the metropoles, they did so relying on
the same sorts of taxes. Compare Edwin R.A. Seligman, The French Colonial System, in
ESSAYS IN COLONIAL FINANCE BY MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION 20,
38 (1900) (showing the majority of Senegal's 1898 revenues came from customs duties and
liquor taxes), with THE INTERNATIONAL YEAR BOOK 321 (Frank Colby & Harry Peck eds.,
1899) ("Of the indirect taxes, which yielded according to the estimates for 1898, 59 per cent.
of the revenue, the most productive were the customs duties, the tax on spirits, the tax on
sugar and the registration tax."). As a practical matter, a less symmetrical arrangement,
perhaps one in which tax collection was centralized at the metropolitan level, may have been
superior. For whatever reason, the metropoles preferred to mirror their own tax structure at
the colonial level.
67. In the abstract, there is little reason to think that the administratively sophisticated
European governments and their far smaller sub-Saharan African counterparts would both be
a good match for the same tax regime. It seems obvious that taxes that would make sense in
one context would be poorly suited to the other. A tax straightforward enough to be
administered effectively in absence of a well-developed bureaucracy would almost
necessarily fail to balance the competing interests a metropolitan tax would need to address.
68. Returning to the comparison between Senegal-a midsized French colony-and
France, Senegal's revenues in 1898 amounted to 0.12% of France's revenue. See Seligman,
supm note 66, at 38 (estimating Senegal's 1898 revenues at just under 4,000,000 francs);
Colby & Peck, supra note 66, at 321 (estimating France's 1898 revenues at just over
3,400,000,000 francs).
69. Isidore Loeb, The German Colonial Fiscal System, in ESSAYS IN COLONIAL
FINANCE BY MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION 40, 42 (1900) ("Particular
emphasis was placed [by opponents of colonial expansion] upon the cost of colonial
undertakings, and the resulting burden upon the home taxpayer.... The government,
accordingly, adopted a conservative policy.").
70. CRAWFORD YOUNG, THE AFRICAN COLONIAL STATE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
97 (1994) ("Metropolitan treasuries, citadels of skepticism concerning the material benefits
likely to accrue from colonial expansion in Africa, insisted on an iron law of fiscal self-
sufficiency of the newly acquired colonial territories."). The depth of the resistance to
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simple indifference,7' made it essential for the colonies to collect taxes.
Faced with a need to generate tax revenue in the colonies to satisfy the
demands of administering and expanding those colonies, the
metropoles by and large did the obvious. Administrators relied on the
same taxes that served them well at home.
Because the complex relationship between taxation and
sovereignty has no bearing, the explanation may be more straight-
forward.73 The metropoles appear to have simply been reluctant to use
metropolitan revenues to finance colonial expenditures. That parochial
reticence and the resulting need for sub-Saharan colonies to finance all
or part of their own administration have been called the principle of
"colonial self-sufficiency."7  Although not independent states, it
seemed self-evident that the colonies should possess a complete taxing
apparatus and that it should mirror that of the metropole.
C Symmetry and the Modem Intemational Tax Regime
To today's international tax experts, references to nineteenth
century relationships between colonies and metropoles are certain to
seem both alien and irrelevant. Nevertheless, the link between today's
international tax regime and the colonial era is far from attenuated.
During the years in which the modern regime took shape, the post-
World War II independence movement that ended the colonial
expending metropolitan funds on the colonies was exemplified in the granting of
concessionary charters to private companies for large capital projects. The metropoles
sacrificed valuable future ights to revenues and profits rather than contribute capital up front.
See IEUAN LL. GRIFFITHS, THE AFRICAN INHERITANCE 54 (1995).
71. Metropolitan electorates "were decidedly uninterested in their colonial estates,
and their parliamentary representatives could not be persuaded to allocate sums for the
exploitation of these holdings. Thus the colonies had to be self-financing" Peter Kilby,
Manufacturing in ColonialAfica, in 4 COLONIALISM IN AFRICA 1870-1960, at 470, 492 (Peter
Duignan & L.H. Gann eds., 1975) (describing the mood of English and French electorates).
72. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
73. Had the colonies been sovereign, the traditional arguments linking sovereignty
and taxation would apply. See generally Ring, supra note 6. Alternatively, had sovereignty
been the long-term goal of the colonial project, it may have been farsighted to lay the fiscal
foundation of each future state at the start. Obviously, the colonies were neither independent
nor, in this relatively early stage of the colonial project, being groomed for independence.
See YOUNG, supra note 70, at 182-83 (noting that even by the mid-twentieth century most
colonial powers saw independence for their African colonies as something likely to occur in
the distant future, if at all).
74. YOUNG, supra note 70, at 97 ("The principle of colonial self-sufficiency dates
from 1815 .... Only Italy was a systematic exception to this rule; Eritrea, Somalia, and
Libya were costly ventures, requiring metropolitan financial commitments throughout the
colonial period."). The reluctance to finance the administration of the colonies varied
somewhat over time, with greater emphasis being placed on the need for fiscal autonomy by
the early twentieth century. Id.
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relationship between Europe and sub-Saharan Africa was still decades
into the future."
For tax experts of the day, the role of taxation in the colonial
enterprise would not have been foreign at all. One of the so-called
"four economists"76 that are often credited as architects of the
international tax regime, Edwin Seligman, even contributed to a
volume titled "Essays in Colonial Finance" published by the American
Economics Association in 1900."7 The colonies and the notion that
each jurisdiction, no matter how different, should have essentially
interchangeable tax regimes were simply part of the world those tax
experts knew. Given that context, it may be difficult to imagine
experts such as Seligman doing anything other than creating an
international tax regime that would take both the existence and
importance of uniformity for granted.
The bilateral tax treaties they helped to design-borrowing
heavily from existing European tax treaties78-form the backbone of
today's international tax regime. Those treaties are an important
conduit through which harmonization secured its dominant position in
international taxation. They allow pairs of nations to coordinate
aspects of their tax regimes according to what has been referred to as
the "benefits principle."79 Over time, double-tax treaties have become
so ubiquitous as to be virtually synonymous with international tax
cooperation."
75. YOUNG, supra note 70, at 182-217 (describing shift towards independence that
occurred after World War II).
76. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 63, at 318 ("Edwin Seligman ... was the guiding spirit
behind the 1923 'four economists' report to the League of Nations (1923 Report), which laid
the foundations for the international tax regime... ").
77. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
78. See Mitchell B. Carroll, International Tax Law. Benefits for American Investors
and EnterprisesAbroad, 2 INT'L LAW. 692, 693 (1968).
79. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 52
TAX L. REv. 507, 509 (1997) ("The Benefits Principle assigns the right to tax active
(business) income primarily to the source jurisdiction, while the right to tax passive
(investment) income is assigned primarily to the residence jurisdiction."). The logic of the
benefits principle rests in part on the Lockean notion that governments earn the right to
collect tax revenues by providing the services that make the creation of the underlying
income possible. Id. at 521 ("[T]he provision of infrastructure or education, as well as more
specific government policies such as keeping the exchange rate stable or interest rates low...
justiflies] source-based corporate taxation in the sense that the host country's government
bears some of the costs of providing the benefits that are necessary for earning the income.").
80. "The public international law of taxation is dominated by over 1,500 bilateral
treaties (the number goes up steadily) for the prevention of double taxation of income and
capital." Victor Thuronyi, International Tax Cooperation and a Multilateral Treaty, 26
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1641, 1641 (2001) (citation omitted).
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Double-tax treaties take two tax regimes that are similar and
refine those similarities. Their coordination function and the viral
process through which those treaties propagate8' mean that they
encourage harmonization 82 in two ways. First, double-tax treaties
create a limited, international law sphere of substantive harmonization
that prevents double taxation by ensuring that each state limits the
application of its tax system in accordance with the same conception
of the benefits principle. 3
The other process by which tax treaties promote harmonization is
incidental to the elimination of double taxation. Because those treaties
are reciprocal, essentially making each treaty a barter arrangement,
they work best when each state's tax regime is similar.84 Because the
costs of not having access to treaty benefits can be significant, treaties
provide an incentive for nations to standardize their tax systems. This
two-part process creates a pattern in which double-tax treaties both
invite and produce symmetry. Over time and at the margins, the role
of treaty benefits in promoting harmonization has been significant.
Unfortunately, the link between double-tax treaties and symmetry
has a downside. When a pair of states has tax systems that are
81. John E Avery Jones, Are Tax Treaties Necessary, 53 TAX L. REv. 1, 3 (1999)
(calling tax treaties "self-perpetuating").
82. See Daniel Shaviro, Some Observations Concerning Multijurisdictional Tax
Competition, in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES 58 (Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin eds., 2001) (describing the importance
of double-tax treaties for harmonization).
83. See Avi-Yonah, supm note 79. Even though each jurisdiction's internal laws
remain unchanged, the treaty reduces the practical significance of those differences.
84. Both today's treaties and the early models from which they evolved operate by
orchestrating a quid pro quo of reciprocal tax concessions. See Carroll, supm note 78, at 693.
For such an arrangement to take root, both treaty partners' tax systems must be similar in
important respects. Obviously, each nation must impose an income tax. That income tax
must also have a broadly similar reach. As a result, the rise of those treaties gave an
advantage to nations that fit the dominant mold and provided an incentive to others to
conform. This standardization process reaches its height-or perhaps its nadir-in the
lengths to which states go to maintain internal laws for the specific purpose of being replaced
by treaty provisions. See, e.g., Jones, supm note 81, at 3 (describing pattern of enacting
"outrageous ... provisions of internal law" so that others "will come running to its door
asking for a treaty in familiar form").
85. It may be difficult to imagine a nation introducing a comprehensive income tax
simply to secure the reduced U.S. tax burdens such a treaty might ultimately produce. It is
not quite so farfetched to think that an unwillingness to give up those benefits would inhibit a
move away from an income tax. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 104TH CONG.,
IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS OF REPLACING THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX
(Comm. Print 1996), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/s-5-96.pdf ("If the United States
adopts a new tax system that is vastly different ... [a] treaty country could choose to
terminate its present income tax treaty with the United States, if the treaty is no longer
relevant because of the incompatibility of the two taxing systems.").
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fundamentally mismatched, double-tax treaties can do nothing to spur
harmonization. 6 The two most striking examples of those limits are
the disappearance of treaties with tax havens at the moment that a
strong relationship between the relevant governments was needed
most87 and the absence of treaties with sub-Saharan Africa.Y Because
double-tax treaties can only build on preexisting symmetry, those
treaties can only reach so far. The absence of a critical mass of
symmetry creates a chicken-and-egg dilemma referred to below as the
harmonization conundrum. Without symmetry to build on,
harmonization becomes impossible.
D Cross-Border Symmetry in a Heterogeneous World
As the preceding discussion suggests, homogeneity has long been
both a product of and a precondition for the success of the
international tax regime. On the whole, this dynamic has been fruitful,
but it also creates a problem. Because harmonization presupposes a
meaningful degree of uniformity among cooperating states, when that
underlying homogeneity is lacking, our harmonization-based
international tax regime is rendered powerless, effectively making
cooperation itself very difficult.
As taxpayers find it increasingly easy to disregard both borders
and distance, finding solutions to today's international tax dilemmas
will require meaningful engagement, not only between nations that are
more or less the same, but also between those that are profoundly
different. That raises the prospect that the harmonization
conundrum-the absence of symmetry is itself an obstacle to creating
symmetry-will stifle the evolution of the international tax regime and
prevent the emergence of cooperative relationships between
mismatched states.
86. Even when two states' tax regimes are broadly similar, underlying differences in
their economic conditions pose an obstacle for double-tax treaties. The fight between some
developed and developing countries over tax sparing offers an example of that dynamic. See
Christians, supra note 9, at 694-95 (noting that the United States refuses to adopt tax sparing
provisions while some developing countries refuse to sign tax treaties that omit such
provisions).
87. See Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dep't, Treasury Department Announces
Termination of Extensions of Income Tax Conventions Between the U.S. and the U.K. and the
U.S. and Belgium to 18 Countries and Territories (July 1, 1983) (announcing termination of
treaty extensions with former colonies that had come to be perceived as tax havens).
88. Christians, supra note 9, at 641.
89. See Jones, supra note 81, at 1 ("Tax treaties are a very considerable success story
for the OECD and its predecessors, the League of Nations, and the OEEC.").
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The frustrations of the current state of the international tax
regime are best illustrated by the problem of offshore tax evasion, or
tax flight. Tax flight occurs when taxpayers camouflage their income
or assets by using offshore accounts or entities.9  Substantive
harmonization would obviously go a long way towards eliminating tax
flight.9 1  Unfortunately, there is no clear path towards that
harmonization. Today, neither the brute force of the colonial era nor
double-tax treaties can manage the alchemical trick of producing
symmetry from asymmetry.92  One possible solution to that
harmonization conundrum is finding a means of generating the
requisite critical mass of symmetry. To do that, jurisdictions troubled
by tax flight turned to the power of informal norms.
To persuade tax havens to enter into cooperative-nominally
reciprocal but substantively asymmetrical 93-information exchange
relationships, Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and
Development (OECD) members sought to employ both carrots and
sticks, combining veiled threats of sanctions9" with the compliance pull
of an international regime. 95 In part through the OECD,96 they worked
to articulate a set of norms ultimately embodied in formal cooperation
commitments from target states and buoyed by the promise of
"defensive measures" 97 from OECD members to encourage the
90. See Dean, supm note 8, at 924-25.
91. As a theoretical matter, if the tax haven jurisdictions in which those accounts and
entities are often formed were to import the tax systems of those jurisdictions suffering from
tax flight lock, stock, and barrel, it would become much easier to prevent businesses and
individuals from hiding their income. That is because persuading tax havens to mirror other
nations' substantive and procedural tax rules would give tax havens both more reason and
more opportunity to cooperate in the fight against tax flight. See Dean, supra note 8, at 925-
26 & nn.61-62.
92. The brute force approach of the colonial era, although perhaps appealing to some,
is no longer a realistic option. At the same time, significant and persistent gaps in the global
tax treaty network suggest that, despite the potency of those treaties, the existing international
tax regime is unlikely to bridge the gap with tax havens. Even though the treaties that form
the backbone of that regime have considerable power to shape nations' behaviors, their
connection to tax havens is minimal and growing weaker rather than stronger.
93. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
94. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DE., HARMFuL TAX COMPETiTION: AN
EMERGiNG GLOBAL ISSUE 37 (1998) (suggesting the possibility of "co-ordinated" "defensive
measures").
95. See Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT'L
L. 705, 705 (1988) ("[M]ost states observe systemic rules much of the time in their relations
with other states'").
96. In conjunction with that initiative, the OECD published a landmark report on
harmful tax competition. SeeORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 94.
97. Id.
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reluctant. 8 In essence, the OECD initiative represented an effort to
harness the potential of informal norms to short-circuit the
harmonization conundrum in order to expand the reach of the
international tax regime beyond the limits of the aging double-tax
treaty infrastructure.
There is little doubt that norms can serve as highly effective tools
for regulating behavior.9 Individuals and states alike can "internalize
norms and act in accordance with them because they understand them
to be correct or appropriate."" Nevertheless, understanding precisely
how and why those norms emerge and take root is more difficult than
observing that they sometimes do.'"' One requirement appears to be
that those governed by a set of norms share a collective identity' 2 or
98. The initiative's eventual focus on information sharing was consistent with the
growing consensus that greater information access was the key to combating tax flight. See
Roin, supra note 6, at 545 ("Although there has already been some movement [towards]
obtaining better tax information... it should become a primary rather than secondary goal of
tax reform efforts.").
99. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) (explaining power of informal norms to govern social interactions).
The success of the Basel Committee and the International Organization of Securities
Commissions in creating cooperative financial regulatory standards shows that norms can
work well in the international economic law context. See David Zaring, Informal Procedure,
Hard and Sofl, in InternationalAdministration, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 547 (2005).
100. Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of
InternationalLaw, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 469, 481 (2005) ("[I]nterest-based scholars are wrong to
assume that states engage only in consequentialist pursuit of objective self-interest.").
101. Norms, neither weeds nor hothouse flowers, flourish in many-but not all-
environments. The classic hypothesis holds that norms thrive in relatively homogenous,
close-knit contexts. See ELLICKSON, supra note 99, at 177 n.35 ("[T]he more close-knit a
group is, the better it will be able to use its informal-control system to minimize the sum of
transaction costs and deadweight losses."). That homogeneity promotes the trust necessary
for mutually beneficial cooperation to succeed. Unlike a tenth-century French villager who
consumes virtually nothing not produced by one of his village's eighty residents, states-at
least in terms of taxation-do not have the luxury of belonging to a community able to
"spontaneously enforce[] its morality as a set of compulsory norms." RUSSELL HARDIN,
TRUST 7 (2006). Neither tax homogeneity nor tax cooperation is easy to come by in today's
international tax regime. The profound differences that exist among nations and national tax
systems that limit the reach of the double-tax treaty network also inhibit the processes by
which norms encourage compliance and discourage defection.
102. That shared identity need not be the product of the cloistered existence of the
tenth century resident of a "grim and oppressive" village referred to above. See HARDIN,
supra note 101, at 7. It could instead be a function of the more limited relationships that
predominate in modem life. See HARDIN, supra note 101, at 8. Dueling offers an example of
the ties that support the functioning of norms. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of
Social Meaning, 62 U. ChI. L. REv. 943, 968-72 (1995) (noting that the social norms
governing the illegal, but widely observed, practice of dueling limited it to a very specific
group). "Odd as it may seem, this practice of dueling-the ritual of retiring to a field and
firing pistols at one another to satisfy a social insult-was the domain of southern gentlemen
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are rendered trustworthy' °3 through the existence of a relationship they
value.'" Those ties provide an avenue through which breaches may be
sanctioned.'
Unfortunately, after decades branded as outlaws, tax havens
appeared to believe they had little reason to abide by those norms.' °6
As a result, employing informal norms offered no escape from the
harmonization conundrum. Instead, the limitations and failures of the
extant international tax regime were simply replicated in the
alternative, norm-driven regime.
IV THE TAx DEHARMONIZATION ALTERNATIVE
Tax harmonization offers a mechanism for reducing cross-border
tax conflict, but it is not the only mode of cooperation that allows
states to simultaneously generate efficiency and legitimacy.
Collaborative specialization offers one alternative. Arrangements in
which a jurisdiction devotes tax resources not simply to raising
revenues through its own tax system-but instead deploys them in
concert with other jurisdictions contributing different resources-
could do as much or more to achieve those aims. If each jurisdiction's
unique contribution reflects a relative advantage it enjoys compared to
other participating jurisdictions, that pooling would create a tax that is
normatively superior to one that harmonization could produce.' 7 It
only. Not just anyone could successfully challenge another for a duel; only someone with a
sufficiently high social standing." Id. at 968 (citations omitted).
103. See HARDIN, supm note 101, at 1-2 (highlighting importance of "trustworthiness"
as a prerequisite to trust).
104. See id. at 31 (explaining "encapsulated interest theory of trust" as typically
relying on an ongoing relationship "that the trusted would like.., to continue").
105. See Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90
CAL. L. REv. 1823, 1827 (2002) ("[C]ompliance occurs due to state concern about both
reputational and direct sanctions triggered by violations of the law.").
106. Tax havens already played the role of outsiders to the international tax regime.
That meant that the threat of reputational and other sanctions that might otherwise have been
employed to encourage them to conform to prevailing norms had little incremental effect. It
certainly suggests that tax havens and their critics do not "have highly homogeneous beliefs
about" international tax policy. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 13, at 200 (describing conditions
that contributed to the success of the Basel Committee). If a jurisdiction has been seen, and
has grown to see itself, as an outlaw, norms seem an unlikely means of returning it to the fold.
As Franck might put it, "[o]bligation is perceived to be owed to a community of states as a
necessary reciprocal incident of membership in the community." Franck, supra note 95, at
753 (emphasis omitted). Because tax havens have been explicitly cast as outsiders to the
international tax regime, they were unlikely to feel obligated to adhere to that regime.
107. A simple example can illustrate the benefit of such an exchange. Assume that
two jurisdictions, Big and Small, will use two tax resources to impose a new carbon tax:
administrative resources and enforcement resources. Also assume that Big can provide both
resources at less cost per $ 100 of carbon tax revenue collected. Big can administer a carbon
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would, of course, also obviate the need for each jurisdiction to
maintain identical regimes.' °8
This Part expands on the parallel between simplification and
harmonization to provide a means of isolating the benefits
harmonization provides.'" Thinking about cross-border differences as
just another form of complexity makes it easy to understand the two
key benefits of tax harmonization: efficiency and legitimacy. It also
suggests why those benefits always seem to be just out of reach."'
Fortunately, the analogy between harmonization and simplification is
flawed. While simplification is the only means of combating
complexity, harmonization is just a subset of a broader array of
international tax cooperation strategies.
At the risk of understatement, actually achieving the high level of
homogeneity that represents tax harmonization's ideal endgame would
be challenging."' Of course, asking sovereign governments to agree to
tax for $5 per $100 of revenue collected, while it would cost Small $6. Big can also enforce a
carbon tax for $2 per $100 of revenue collected, while it would cost Small $4. Even though
Big has an absolute advantage in both enforcement and administration (it can do both more
cheaply than Small can), it would still make sense to concentrate enforcement in Big and
administration in Small because Big has a relatively strong advantage in enforcement. That
would produce a combined cost of $8 per $100 of revenue (Small's $6 administration cost
plus Big's $2 in enforcement cost). If administered and enforced independently, the cost
would be $8.50 per $100 of revenue ($5+$6+$2+$4=$17 per $200 or $8.50 per $100).
Survivors of an introductory economics class will recognize this as an illustration of the
principle of comparative advantage.
108. One could reasonably ask whether that specialization would simply represent a
particularly baroque form of tax harmonization pursuant to which a group of states
collectively administer an identical tax. If states were to adopt a deharmonized carbon tax,
for example, in a sense they would have achieved partial base harmonization, even though
each might play a unique role in administering the tax. If that were the case, virtually any
international tax cooperation in which a pair of states cooperates on tax matters could be
lumped into the same category, and the term tax harmonization would be rendered virtually
meaningless. Even if only half of the pair actually collected the relevant tax, that could be
dismissed as a mere rate differential.
109. See supm notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
111. Even if each nation were writing on a blank slate, creating an identical base, rate
structure and administrative regime in every one would be a Herculean task. In reality,
nations would be starting from very different points. Obviously, the formal rules that make
up their tax regimes differ. See generally Ring, supm note 3. Perhaps more significantly, the
broader tax cultures in which those rules operate are not only distinct but are also deeply
entrenched. Michael A. Livingston, From Milan to Mumbai Changing in Tel Aviv-
Reflections on Progressive Taxation and "'Progressive"Politics in a Globalized but Still Local
World, 54 Am. J. COMP. L. 555, 560 (2006) ("Tax culture... may be defined to refer to the
body of beliefs and practices that are shared by tax practitioners and policy-makers in a given
society and thus provide the background or context in which substantive tax decisions are
made."). From a more practical perspective, enormous disparities exist in the administration
of different national tax systems. Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Technology and Taxation
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a single, uniform standard for almost any purpose is difficult. Because
taxation lies so close to the core of national sovereignty, it is not
surprising that attempts to foster international tax cooperation have
yielded more frustration than harmonization.' 2 The question this Part
poses is whether a misplaced devotion to harmonization is itself part of
the problem.
A. The Benefits of Tax Harmonization
The great diversity that exists among national tax regimes
suggests how monumental the task of achieving true harmonization
would be."3 Having imagined that remarkable degree of symmetry, the
inevitable question for a national government is precisely how
marching in lockstep with others would benefit it. The most
straightforward answer is that it creates benefits much like those that
tax simplification provides.
1. Efficiency
The primary appeal of both simplification and harmonization is
rooted in a concern for economic efficiency.' 4  Tax simplification
focuses on the expenditures taxpayers make to meet and minimize
their tax obligations and the steps a government can take to reduce
them."5 In essence, tax harmonization does the same.
in Developing Countries: From Hand to Mouse (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law-Econ. Research
Paper No. 08-07, 2008), available athttp://ssm.com/abstract-=1086853. In combination, those
differences create an environment in which global tax uniformity seems highly unlikely.
112. "No significant issue in international tax can be discussed without raising the
question of sovereignty." See Ring, supra note 6, at 156.
113. See Ring, supra note 3, at 81 ("Despite many common features in our trading
partners' tax systems, the multitude of factors that produce tax law, including social policy,
administrative constraints, and political compromise render conflicting rules a likely
possibility.").
114. Efficiency is commonly cited as the justification for tax simplification efforts.
See Dean, supra note 54, at 416 & nn.45-46. Efficiency is also generally used to justify the
existence of double-tax treaties, which have been called "the main mechanism for ...
harmonization." Shaviro, supra note 82, at 58.
115. The related expenditures of government actors and third parties can also be
thought of as costs of tax complexity. See Tax Reform: Heating Before the H. Comm. on
Ways & Means, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Joel B. Slemrod, Paul W McCracken
Collegiate Professor of Business, Economics, and Public Policy, Professor of Economics, and
Director of the Office of Tax Policy Research, University of Michigan) ("In my view the most
informative measure of tax complexity is the resource cost of collecting taxes. This is equal
to the IRS budget plus the value of the time and money spent by the taxpayers and third
parties to the collection process (such as employers who withhold tax for their employees.).").
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Tax complexity is said to impose three distinct costs on
taxpayers."6 Rule complexity refers to the costs taxpayers incur to
understand the obligations tax rules impose on them."7 Compliance
complexity represents taxpayers' exertions to ensure that they meet
those obligations."8  The third type of complexity is transactional
complexity. It is transactional because it reflects the expenses
taxpayers incur by engaging in transactions conducted in pursuit of tax
benefits. "'9
In combination, those costs represent a significant drain on
societal welfare. Each dollar spent by taxpayers to understand and
comply with their tax obligations or to plan and execute tax-saving
strategies is a dollar that will not be spent or invested in a more
productive manner." Even if a given expenditure yields a positive
return for the taxpayer in question, it represents a net loss for society.
Tax harmonization targets the distinct yet equally wasteful
expenditures triggered by the interactions of disparate tax systems.
Unlike taxpayers that operate exclusively within a single jurisdiction,
multijurisdictional taxpayers must consider not only the complexities
associated with each jurisdiction but also must take into account what
amounts to an additional layer of complexity that results from the clash
of mismatched concepts and rules.'' Those expenditures represent
more than the sum of rule, compliance, and transactional complexity
encountered within the two or more jurisdictions in which the taxpayer
conducts activities.
Such taxpayers must, for example, pay not only to understand the
tax rules of the two jurisdictions, but also to understand how the two
distinct sets of rules interact.' Likewise, they must not only comply
116. See DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAx 266-67 (1986).
117. Id.
118. Id
119. Id. At the extreme, taxpayers invest in aggressive tax shelters, investing in
complex strategies and perhaps spending $2 on rule, compliance, and transactional
complexity for every $3 they save in tax. On a more modest scale, tax laws afford taxpayers
many opportunities to modify their behavior in more subtle ways, incurring similar costs to
reduce their tax liability.
120. See Dean, supm note 54, at 416-18.
121. See Philip R. West, Foreign Law in US. International Taxation: The Search for
Standards; 3 FLA. TAX. REv. 147, 148 (1996).
122. Perhaps the most intriguing example of the complex relationship between U.S.
tax law and foreign law is a regulation dealing with hybrid entities--entities that are
classified differently in different jurisdictions. The regulation explicitly makes the U.S. tax
treatment of an entity dependent on its treatment in another jurisdiction, making it impossible
to determine the U.S. tax treatment of some entities without first understanding their
treatment under foreign law. 26 C.ER. § 1.894-1(d)(2)(ii)(B)(1) (2008) (governing the
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with two sets of tax rules but must also ensure that the two compliance
efforts do not conflict. Finally, by virtue of being subject to two
different tax regimes, taxpayers more than double their opportunities
for achieving tax savings by engaging in socially wasteful behavior.'23
The result is that such taxpayers encounter added complexity
whenever they venture into a new jurisdiction. Part of that complexity
is intrinsic to the new jurisdiction's tax regime (static complexity) and
part exists only because the taxpayers have a simultaneous presence in
two distinct jurisdictions (dynamic complexity).
2. Legitimacy
By reducing static complexity and eradicating dynamic
complexity, harmonization can provide welfare benefits that parallel
those that make tax simplification so appealing. On their own, those
efficiency gains make tax harmonization appealing. Like
simplification, tax harmonization also offers the promise of something
more: legitimacy.'2 4 To understand why, it is helpful to recognize that
the efficiency gains described above could largely be achieved via a
very different route. Each state could easily be forced to adopt similar
regimes if cutthroat interjurisdictional tax competition were allowed to
flourish.
For example, it is sometimes assumed that unfettered competition
would drive tax rates on geographically mobile capital to zero.' 5 In
their zeal to attract or retain such investments, and the nontax benefits
associated with them, nations would have no choice but to forgo any
tax claim with respect to that capital. Because they would no longer be
subject to taxes on cross-border investments, individuals and
businesses would face neither static nor dynamic rule, compliance, or
transactional complexity when they invest overseas. At least in terms
of those sources of efficiency loss, tax competition can produce
precisely the same result that could be achieved through tax
harmonization.
availability of treaty benefits to certain entities). See generally West, supra note 121, at 147
(discussing role of foreign law in U.S. tax law).
123. In addition to engaging in tax planning within each jurisdiction, taxpayers can
exploit differences between them. In some cases, that exploitation is said to constitute "tax
arbitrage." See Kane, supra note 3, at 96 (offering a definition of tax arbitrage).
124. In the case of simplification, the added legitimacy is a function of the
transparency created by simplicity. BRADFORD, supra note 116, at 4 (noting that complexity
can undermine confidence in the fairness of a tax).
125. Shaviro, supra note 82, at 61 (describing the concern that capital mobility could
make taxing capital income impossible).
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How, then, are tax harmonization and tax competition different?'26
The true difference between harmonization and competition is not
simply a matter of outcomes, but of process. While tax harmonization
would produce symmetry through cooperation, competition would do
it with rivalry. Affirmatively seeking to harmonize disparate tax
regimes would require concerted engagement among cooperating
nations. Both choosing a single standard and working to conform to
that standard would demand a high level of commitment and
interaction. That process would provide an avenue for governments
and, by extension, their constituents to participate in the design of the
resulting system.
Tax competition's uniformity, by contrast, is more likely to unfold
in the absence of sustained dialogue among affected nations. Because
the harmonized regime would be the product of intergovernmental
negotiation and consent rather than simply a capitulation to
overwhelming market forces, voters would have had, indirectly, a hand
in its creation. An identical result achieved through the collaborative
process of harmonization would enjoy the benefit of the increased
legitimacy that accompanies engagement and participation.'27
In the tax context that legitimacy may be especially important.
28
The legitimacy advantage harmonization would enjoy could prove
126. One possibility is that tax harmonization would be more likely than competition
to produce a global tax regime that appropriately balances the many competing interests of
relevant states. The best illustration of this may be the presumption that tax harmonization,
unlike competition, would produce a relatively broad tax base. Such a broad tax base would
be both efficient and distributionally appealing. Obviously, it would be comforting to
conclude that attention from national governments would be more likely to produce an
optimal cross-border tax regime than neglect. Unfortunately, it is also possible that nations
could choose to converge towards a uniform regime with a relatively narrow base that, for
instance, wholly excludes geographically mobile capital from the tax base.
127.
[P]erception of legitimacy will vary in degree from rule to rule and time to time. It
becomes a crucial factor, however, in the capacity of any rule to secure compliance
when, as in the international system, there are no other compliance-inducing
mechanisms.
Legitimacy is used here to mean that quality of a rule which derives from a
perception on the part of those to whom it is addressed that it has come into being
in accordance with right process.
Franck, supra note 95, at 706 (emphasis omitted).
128. Often, there is tension between the two goals of creating a legitimate cross-border
framework and building one that is robust. The tension is apparent with respect to the
question of "linkage" among international tax regimes. See David W Leebron, Linkages, 96
AM. J. INT'L L. 5, 24-27 (2002) (noting potential pitfalls of linking distinct issue areas, for
example, linking environmental issues to international trade). Using the existing
international trade infrastructure to address environmental issues might help answer questions
about the World Trade Organization's legitimacy but would also complicate the negotiation
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vital to the success of a harmonized tax regime by promoting
voluntary taxpayer compliance at the individual level'29 as well as
greater "compliance pull""'3 at the national level. In other words, both
taxpayers and states are more likely to embrace an international tax
regime produced by harmonization-thereby having "come into being
in accordance with right process"-than one resulting primarily from
competition.'3
B. The Benefits of Tax Deharmonization
Tax harmonization produces two benefits. First, it increases
efficiency by combating dynamic complexity. Second, it generates the
legitimacy that is vital to the success of international tax arrangements.
Deharmonization could produce precisely the same results without
turning states' tax regimes into carbon copies of one another.
1. Efficiency
The benefits of tax deharmonization are in some respects no
different than those produced by harmonization. This is obviously true
with respect to efficiency.'32 Although the route by which it increases
efficiency is precisely the reverse of harmonization, deharmonization
targets the same dynamic rule, compliance, and transactional
complexity. By prescribing distinct roles for different jurisdictions,
deharmonization limits the likelihood that two or more jurisdictions
will attempt to cover the same terrain and do so incompatibly.
For example, if a group of states were to coordinate the
introduction of a carbon tax, they could avoid conflicts by creating
identical rules and institutions in each jurisdiction. If we assume that
process. A related trade-off is sometimes seen in choosing between different international
organizations to address a problem. In the international tax context, the broader membership
of the United Nations may give it a stronger claim to legitimacy than an organization like the
OECD, but the OECD has consistently been a leader on international tax issues. See Dean,
supra note 3, at 662 n.369. The OECD's success is arguably the result of its more limited
membership and the greater focus that limited membership permits. In the tax context, that
tension between efficacy and legitimacy may not be particularly pronounced.
129. Because a harmonized regime would create a link between the will of taxpayers
and the tax rules that govern them, it may encourage greater voluntary participation than an
identical regime that is the product of conflict. See Ring, supra note 6, at 175 ("[A] strong
democratic process with a close link between the citizen-taxpayer and the government may
also improve participation in the tax system,").
130. Franck refers to the capacity of a rule to elicit voluntary compliance at the state
level as "compliance pull." Franck, supra note 95, at 713.
131. Id. at 706 (emphasis omitted).
132. See supra notes 114-123 and accompanying text.
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husbanding a carbon tax consumes legislative, judicial, and executive
resources, a harmonized regime would exist if each cooperating
jurisdiction committed to matching the efforts of the other participants.
The result would be a minimum of dynamic complexity and the
legitimacy that only cooperation can produce.
Alternatively, they could choose to distribute those functions
across different jurisdictions. If each of the three cooperating
jurisdictions assumed exclusive responsibility for just one of those
three functions, the result in terms of dynamic complexity (and
legitimacy) would be the same."'
Of course, there are also meaningful differences between
harmonization and deharmonization. Jurisdictions' widely varying
characteristics, from the size of their economies to the technological
sophistication of their bureaucracies, suggest that particular
governments will generally be better suited to filling some roles than
others.'34 As a result, specialization along a variety of axes could
produce significant efficiency gains at the governmental level.'35 The
resulting welfare gains would make that asymmetric cooperation both
appealing and stable.' 6
To understand why this is true, it may be useful to think of each
government's tax apparatus as a freestanding, revenue-raising entity.
Today, each of those entities operates on a fully vertically integrated
basis, conducting every activity necessary for the imposition of a tax
and the collection of income. ' From a pure efficiency perspective,
this may make no more sense than requiring each member of a
community to grow all of their own food.'38
133. Concentrating functions within particular national governments could produce
savings like those touted by the Multistate Tax Commission with respect to its Joint Audit
Program. Multistate Tax Comm'n, About the Multistate Tax Commission Audit Program,
https://www.mtc.gov/Audit.aspx?id=578&Itemld=578 (last visited Oct. 23, 2009) ("A single
MTC audit takes the place of separate and duplicative audits by member states, and provides
obvious economies of scale to the states.").
134. SeeBird&Zolt,supranote 111.
135. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
136. See Daniel Shaviro, Why Worldwide Welfare as a Normative Standard in US.
Tax Policy., 60 TAX L. REv. 155, 178 (2007) (suggesting policies that increase worldwide
welfare can be stable because they can make winners of all countries).
137. The contentious recent effort to privatize tax collection may be the exception that
proves the rule. See Joseph J. Thomdike, Historical Perspective: The Unhappy History of
Private Tax Collection, TAX Noms, Sept. 20, 2004, at 1346 (criticizing recent effort to
privatize tax collection).
138. Although specialization requires a degree of trust that your neighbor will refrain
from relying on dangerous fertilizers to produce his delicious strawberries, it may also allow




The collective welfare benefits that deharmonization could
produce are not the only argument in its favor. Because
deharmonization is, like harmonization, a form of affirmative
international cooperation, it would have a similarly positive impact in
terms of legitimacy.'39 Both harmonization and deharmonization
would produce legitimacy along with the individual-'4 ° and state-level'4'
compliance benefits that accompany legitimacy.
That engagement does, however, have a downside. Both
harmonization and deharmonization are vulnerable to sovereignty-
driven criticism. Of course, "No significant issue in international tax
can be discussed without raising the question of sovereignty."'4 2 Either
form of cooperation requires states to cede autonomy by committing
themselves to a particular course of action determined in part by other
cooperating states. Formal obstacles to yielding tax sovereignty-such
as the United States Constitution's requirement that "bills for raising
[r]evenue... originate in the House of Representatives"-could easily
transform a political debate over either harmonization or
deharmonization into a legal challenge.' 3
V ADMINISTRATIVE DEHARMONIZATION VS. BASE
DEHARMONIZATION
To this point, the discussion has focused on the importance of
harmonization for the international tax regime and the potential of tax
deharmonization as an alternative route to increased international tax
cooperation. Of course, the fact that deharmonization could play a
meaningful role in promoting greater harmony offers no guarantee that
it will. Taking the measure of the obstacles to deharmonization is
important both for evaluating the prospects for deharmonization
generally and for determining what types of deharmonization
strategies are most likely to succeed. Transaction costs are the primary
obstacle for administrative deharmonization. The "benefits principle"
may pose a bigger threat for base deharmonization." If
deharmonization is to realize its potential, the benefits principle's
139. See supra notes 124-131 and accompanying text (discussing legitimacy
implications of harmonization).
140. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
142. Ring, supm note 6, at 156.
143. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
144. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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narrow focus on the economic activity occurring within a given state
as the exclusive determinant of taxing jurisdiction must be
reconsidered.
A. Obstacles to Deharmonization
This Subpart considers the two key impediments to the successful
implementation of deharmonization strategies: transaction costs and
the benefits principle. Transaction costs are essentially the mirror
image of the legitimacy benefits of the state-to-state interactions
deharmonization would require. Both the up-front and the ongoing
costs of such a system would be considerable. The benefits principle,
in a sense the modem equivalent of "colonial self-sufficiency;' is
incompatible with disaggregating the multiple roles states play in
generating tax revenues.'4
1. Interjurisdictional Transaction Costs
The primary obstacle to achieving the benefits that
specialization-or harmonization, for that matter---can produce is the
need to coordinate.' 6 The principal advantage of uniformity-based
approaches to cooperation is that they tend to reduce the need for
costly negotiations.1"7 In the international tax context, relying on
model treaties' 8 and invoking the power of informal norms'49 to
advance the cause of tax harmonization serve that transaction cost-
minimizing role.
Although the transaction cost differential between harmonization
and deharmonization remains significant, it is clear that interjuris-
145. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. Both the benefits principle and
colonial self-sufficiency take for granted that each jurisdiction is entitled to the tax revenue
generated by economic activity within its borders.
146. That coordination can be provided by a centralized authority, but it can also
emerge spontaneously via the marketplace. The success of free trade, for example, is
premised on the notion that governments need not actively direct the activity of market
participants but need only level the playing field by eliminating tariffs and other barriers to
trade. Simply by opening their borders to trade, governments find the market's "invisible
hand" encouraging businesses to produce goods or services that reflect the relative strengths
of each jurisdiction. Unfortunately, specialization in taxation would ask considerably more of
governments. Fortunately, they have never been in a better position to meet that burden.
147. The most familiar example of this comes in the real property context. Zoning
rules work to keep incompatible uses separated so that there is no need for residents to strike
their own deals to ensure compatibility.
148. See Shaviro, supra note 82, at 59 ("The global setting of [bilateral tax treaties]
lowered transaction costs for individual countries to agree on specific terms of mutual
forbearance.").
149. See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
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dictional transaction costs, particularly the costs of communication and
of acquiring and processing information, have fallen dramatically since
the birth of the modem international tax regime. Particularly over the
past few decades, the same changes that have driven globalization-
and the resulting need for increased international tax cooperation-
such as improvements in telecommunications and information
technology, have also made intergovernmental coordination far less
expensive.'°
In A New World Order, Anne Marie Slaughter considers the
implications of the fact that "[n]etworks of government officials-
police investigators, financial regulators, even judges and legislators-
increasingly exchange information and coordinate activity to combat
global crime and address common problems on a global scale."' In
essence, she argues that the vastly increased bandwidth of the
connections among states have allowed individuals at all levels of
government to collaborate in ways that would have been impossible
even in the relatively recent past.5 2  Put differently, the transaction
costs of intergovernmental cooperation have fallen significantly.
Those lower costs open the door to strategies that would once have
been prohibitively expensive.'53
In an era in which intergovernmental transaction costs were
higher, it might not have made sense to imagine narrowly focused,
possibly short-term international tax arrangements that call on
participating nations to play specialized roles.' Today, given the ease
with which government officials interact on a broad range of issues,
150. The rise of open source software development may be the most powerful example
of this change. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. Of course, not all costs are equally
impacted by technological change. Lawyers and other experts may be more productive
thanks to technology, but their services likely remain relatively expensive.
151. SLAUGHTER, supm note 13, at 1.
152. The Joint International Tax Shelter Information Centre offers an example of the
type of network that has formed with increasing frequency in recent years. See Joint Int'l Tax
Shelter Info. Centre, Memorandum of Understanding, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/jitsic-
fimalmou.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2009). According to the IRS Web site,
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=123016,00.html, this document was signed on
Apr. 23, 2004).
153. One could argue that this is true of the emergence of cap-and-trade regimes such
as those created by the Kyoto Protocol. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf. It would be difficult to imagine the
Protocol having been developed before the advent of cheap global communications.
154. The increasing ease with which governments can cooperate can be seen
domestically at the interstate level. The Multistate Tax Commission's Joint Audit Program
represents an example of how states work together to pool resources and work together to
streamline administrative processes. See Multistate Tax Comm'n, supra note 133.
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there are likely to be circumstances in which states can reasonably
provide one another with targeted assistance that addresses
idiosyncratic or temporary needs. The systemic changes that have led
to the blossoming of transnational networks could also facilitate the
emergence of an entirely new order of cross-border tax relationships.'55
States seeking to develop useful deharmonization strategies, like
the Coasian farmer and rancher agreeing in principle that a fence
should be built to protect crops from cows, must also determine who
should bear its cost and how to ensure each party meets its obligations.
In some cases, that will implicate the classic bargaining problems of
bilateral monopolies, holdouts, and free riders.'
56
For example, if, as is commonly assumed, U.S. taxpayers could
easily substitute another jurisdiction in their tax avoidance schemes,
then entering into TIEAs or tax flight treaties with fewer than all
potential substitute jurisdictions simultaneously would be futile."' A
single holdout would eliminate any potential benefit from TEAs even
if each TIEA partner faithfully abided by its terms. While there is
reason to doubt that all such jurisdictions are actually close substitutes
for one another'58 and ways of minimizing the danger posed by
potential holdouts,'59 the threat of holdouts in this context remains
significant.
Another cause for concern is the risk of bilateral monopoly
between particular TIEA partners. If the United States needs
information about U.S. tax cheats that is available only from one tax
haven jurisdiction, both the United States and the tax haven might lay
claim to the lion's share of the potential surplus from the transaction.'
If no third party exists with the capacity to intervene and impose a
155. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 13.
156. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 60-63 (1986) (discussing
bilateral monopoly, holdouts, and free riders in the nuisance context). Both harmonization
and deharmonization are equally susceptible to those failures.
157. SeeDean, supm note 8, at 958.
158. "Tax havens are not undifferentiated units offering perfectly substitutable
services, nor is price the most important point of competition between them." J.C. SHARMAN,
HAVENS IN A STORM: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL TAx REGULATION 107 (2006); Dhammika
Dharmapala & James R. Hines Jr., Which Counties Become Tax Havens? (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12802, 2006) (considering historical and institutional
factors determining which countries become tax havens).
159. See, e.g., Dean, supra note 8, at 958 (offering "multilateral tax flight treaties" as a
potential solution to the "hold out" problem in the tax haven context).
160. Of course, the information could also be obtained by the United States directly
Presumably the costs of doing so would be high. The difference between those costs and the
costs the tax haven would incur to acquire the information represent one measure of the
surplus to be gained from the information exchange.
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reasonable allocation of the surplus, bilateral monopoly may mean that
no such surplus will be created.'
Finally, because jurisdictions other than the United States face a
similar evasion problem, those jurisdictions would also stand to benefit
from the existence of TIEAs even if they are not party to them. For
example, if a tax haven jurisdiction signals hostility towards tax
evasion by providing information to the United States with respect to
U.S. tax cheats, British tax cheats might choose to avoid that tax haven
in constructing their tax avoidance schemes. That would permit
Britain to stay on the sidelines while the United States creates TIEAs
and shares the surplus it creates with its TEA partners. Britain would
enjoy the benefit of less tax evasion with none of the costs.
2. The Benefits Principle
The benefits principle presents a problem that is unique to
deharmonization.'62 Even if the surplus that would be generated by a
particular cooperative arrangement would be greater than the
transaction costs of setting it in motion, there remains the challenge of
finding a way to share the efficiency gains produced by the
arrangement. Unless each partner happens to derive benefits from the
arrangement that more than offset its costs, that could mean cash
payments by one state to another. That would represent a clear break
with the benefits principle that in some respects is the cornerstone of
the modem international tax regime.' 3
161. This is the role traditionally played by courts in the nuisance context.
162. In the simplest case, the benefits principle can be thought of as "a national rental
charge for the use of its investment environment and natural resources" imposed on foreign
investors. Peggy B. Musgrave, Interjurisdictional Equity in Company Taxation: Principles
and Applications to the European Union, in TAXING CAPITAL INCOME IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR REFORM 46, 52 (Sijbren Cnossen ed., 2000). The benefits
principle also describes the more complex relationship between citizens and residents on the
one hand and states on the other. "There is wide agreement that a country has a right to tax
the income and wealth of its residents or citizens whose rights to the protection and services
provided by the state are matched by their duties to the state, among which is the duty to pay
taxes." PEGGY BREWER RICHMAN, TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCOME: AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 23 (1963).
163. Any system that provides a state with an entitlement to a portion of the tax
revenues that the benefits principle allocates to another would represent a profound departure
from the prevailing approach to assigning tax jurisdiction. Nancy Kaufman observes that in
this context "benefit" is not used in the same manner as it is when referring to "benefits
taxation." "Today's systems of source taxation are not founded on benefit theory, if indeed
they ever were. Source taxation finds its justification in the economic connection between
the source country and the income arising within its borders." Kaufman, supra note 2, at 202.
She suggests that a better term for the quid pro quo between foreign taxpayers and the
jurisdiction that hosts that taxpayer's investment is a "territorial entitlement." Id. at 187.
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Even those who agree on nothing else when it comes to
international taxation would likely agree that each state should be
entitled to revenues derived from economic activity that occurs within
its borders.'" The benefits principle formalizes that parochial impulse
by assigning taxing jurisdiction according to the state that "earns" the
right to tax economic activity by facilitating that activity. That
approach works well if the relative size of each jurisdiction's tax base
serves as a fair proxy for its contribution to a tax, as it presumably
would be in a harmonized regime. When a state makes administrative
or other contributions that are disproportionate to the size of its tax
base, that system breaks down. Because it explicitly disaggregates
functions across states, deharmonization requires a more sophisticated
mechanism for allocating tax revenues than the benefits principle.
B. How To Dehaimonize
Tax deharmonization has already become a significant feature on
the international tax landscape. That is true despite the international
tax regime's traditional orientation towards harmonization. Unlocking
deharmonization's potential requires understanding the implications of
transaction costs and the benefits principle for both administrative and
base deharmonization. As described below, falling transaction costs
suggest that the prospects of administrative deharmonization may be
gradually improving. Base deharmonization faces what may be a
more enduring obstacle in the benefits principle.
1. Administrative Deharmonization
The careful coordination that administrative deharmonization
demands of cooperating states is both a blessing and a curse. The
close working relationship that would permit one jurisdiction to
provide useful administrative assistance to another would be a benefit
on its own. 6' Orchestrating that effort, while obviously less expensive
than it would have been in the relatively recent past, would not be
164. The typical point of disagreement is precisely how the benefits principle should
be operationalized. Even the bold proposal to replace existing source- and residence-based
international tax rules with a formulary regime adheres to the basic parameters of the benefits
principle. See Julie Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved? The Promise and Pitfalls of
Adopting Worldwide FonularyApportionment, 61 TAX L. REv. 169 (2007) (considering the
implications of recent formulary apportionment proposals).
165. Such a relationship could promote the kind of legitimacy that causes both states




costless. Moreover, technological improvements are no cure for the
types of bargaining failures, such as bilateral monopoly and holdouts,
that affect both harmonization and deharmonization.
Fortunately, not all administrative deharmonization strategies are
equally susceptible to those failures. Because they address the
particularly thorny enforcement problem of offshore tax evasion,
TIEAs occupy the end of a spectrum at which those transaction costs
are highest. Other arrangements, particularly those not directed
towards enforcement issues, would be less vulnerable. For example,
there is no reason that a cost-saving deal to outsource data processing
functions would be particularly difficult to negotiate.
There is another, potentially significant, problem created by
administrative deharmonization also illustrated by TEAs. Distributing
administrative functions across jurisdictions may create a "lumpy"
surplus that disproportionately benefits one state, potentially leaving
another worse off than it would have been in the absence of
cooperation. It may, for example, be efficient for State A to contribute
all of the administrative resources necessary to collect a given tax.
Unless State B shares the savings it enjoys from outsourcing those
administrative tasks, State A will be made worse off by cooperating.' 6
Without some form of compensation State A has no incentive to
participate.'67
2. Base Deharmonization
Like administrative deharmonization, base deharmonization may
or may not involve complex bargaining dynamics. Unlike
administrative deharmonization, which contemplates only transfers of
administrative assistance, base deharmonization need not give rise to
awkward incentive problems.'68 In a sense, the reverse is true.
Because base deharmonization treats a jurisdiction's tax base as
just one of many resources necessary to generate tax revenues, funds
derived from one state's tax base are likely to find their way into
166. The technical term for that kind of efficiency is Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.
167. If it is most efficient to concentrate all administrative functions in State A but the
increased costs of administering the taxes of both State A and State B more than offset the
resulting efficiency gains and tax revenues must be allocated in accordance with the benefits
principle, some other form of compensation (for example, foreign aid or trade preferences)
would be necessary.
168. Redesigning TIEAs to permit the state providing administrative assistance to
share in the tax revenues drawn from its partners' tax base would provide a much needed
incentive for that state to cooperate, but would certainly do nothing to eliminate holdouts.
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another state's coffers.'69 The resulting cross-border flows of tax
revenue are fundamentally inconsistent with a conservative vision of
the benefits principle. Rather than treating tax revenues as purely a
function of a state's tax base, base deharmonization would allocate
revenues in proportion to a state's overall contribution to the
production of tax revenue.
If the benefits principle merely serves as a rough proxy for that
cumulative contribution, base deharmonization could simply represent
a refinement of the benefits principle. To the extent it embraces a
normative vision of a jurisdiction's "territorial entitlement" to tax
revenues, the benefits principle would mean that base deharmonization
is not compatible with prevailing attitudes towards international tax
cooperation.'7 ° The nature of states' commitment to the benefits
principle may ultimately be the most important factor in the success or
failure of deharmonization-based international tax cooperation
strategies.
VI. CONCLUSION
Tax deharmonization offers an alternative approach to
international tax cooperation. Some deharmonization strategies, like
SACU, have proven more successful than others, such as TIEAs.
Acknowledging the role that deharmonization plays in today's
international tax regime and working to understand the challenges
deharmonization faces may help states break free of the harmonization
conundrum. By focusing on the need for increased international tax
cooperation, rather than on the lack of cross-border tax uniformity,
policymakers may find unexpected opportunities to build fruitful
partnerships among even the most mismatched states.
169. The SACU Agreement provides for precisely this sort of compensation, but in the
"wrong" direction. South Africa provides the bulk of the administrative resources but
nevertheless pays most of the revenues to its partners. That compensation offsets the benefits
the free trade zone confers on the large, relatively advanced South African economy and the
costs it imposes on the other states. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
170. See discussion supra note 163.
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